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TopicAL SURVEY
U.S. ANTITRUST LAW - CLAYTON ACT - PRIVATE
TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS - STANDING OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SUE
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
60,892 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd on rehearing en banc, [1976-2]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,175 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3685 (Apr. 18, 1977) (No. 76-749).
Antitrust suits were brought against six pharmaceutical
firms' by four foreign governmentS2 under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.3 The foreign states sought to recover treble damages for
1. The pharmaceutical companies involved were: Pfizer, Inc., American Cyana-
mid Company, Bristol-Myers Company, Squibb Corp., Olin Corp. and The Upjohn
Company.
2. The Government of India, The Imperial Government of Iran, The Republic
of the Philippines and The Republic of Vietnam. As to the latter government (the
former government of South Vietnam), the court remanded the issue of the current
validity of its suit to the district court. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-1]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) ff 60,892, at 68,877 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976). The Governments of
Columbia, Korea, and Spain have brought similar suits, although the action involving
Spain has been dismissed. Multidistrict Antitrust Actions Involving Antibiotic Drugs,
405 F. Supp. 1302 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976). The Federal Republic of Germany has also
filed a similar action. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-1] TRADE CAs. at 68,
877 n.1.
3. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
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injuries resulting from an alleged conspiracy among the drug
companies to fix prices and to exclude competition in the sale of
tetracyclin, a broad spectrum antibiotic, in contravention of Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.4 The drug manu-
facturers moved to dismiss the suits on the ground that the foreign
governmental plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Section 4,
claiming that foreign states are not "persons" within the meaning
of the antitrust laws. The District Court for the District of
Minnesota denied the motion5 and the defendants appealed.
After a hearing before a three-judge panel, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 6 Argument was heard before the
Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, held: foreign governments are
persons within the purview of Section 4 of the Clayton Act
and are, therefore, entitled to sue for treble damages sustained
by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws of the United States.7
Two judges dissented, on the grounds that the standing question
should be left for legislative resolution.8
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
4. These consolidated cases are part of a group of over 160 separate actions
known as the Antibiotic Antitrust Cases. These cases include suits against the de-
fendants brought by hospitals, wholesalers, insurance companies, all fifty states and
the United States.
For the background of this litigation, see Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
314 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
5. Republic of the Philippines v. Pfizer, Inc., Order No. 74-31 (D. Minn. Jan.
16, 1974) cited in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-23 (Jan. 21, 1975);
Government of India v. Pfizer, Inc., Order No. 75-48 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 1975)
Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., Order No. 75-49 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 1975).
See also Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
6. Pfizer v. Government of India [1976-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) ff 60,892 (8th
Cir. 1976). The parties had raised this same issue before the Eighth Circuit in earlier
litigation. Pfizer v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950
(1976), but the court remanded without deciding the question. The issue decided in
Pfizer v. Lord, was whether the foreign sovereigns had standing parens patriae to sue
on behalf of their respective citizens. For a discussion of this case see, 16 VA. J. INT'L
L. 437 (1976).
7. The full court affirmed in a per curiam opinion adopting the opinion of the
three-judge panel. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
ff 61,175 (8th Cir. 1976).
& Id.
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Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a remedy to "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."9 The word
"person" is defined in Section 1 of the Act to include "corpora-
tions and associations existing under, or authorized by, the laws
of any state or of any foreign country."'10 The statute is silent,
however, with respect to the standing of governmental entities
to invoke the remedial provisions of the Clayton Act.
According to the Eighth Circuit, whether foreign govern-
ments are "persons" within the meaning of Section 4 is purely a
question of statutory interpretation" and thus is well-suited for
judicial, as opposed to legislative resolution. The court noted
that the federal courts traditionally have been regarded as proper
fora for foreign governmental plaintiffs in various other con-
texts.1 2 In fact, Article III of the United States Constitution
specifically imbues the federal judiciary with subject matter juris-
diction over civil suits brought by or against foreign states and
their citizens."
In reaching its conclusion the court of appeals was guided by
two decisions of the United States Supreme Court which con-
cerned the standing of the Federal Government and the domestic
states to maintain treble damage suits under the former Section 7
of the Sherman Act.14 The first of the cited cases, United States
v. Cooper Corporation5 was decided in 1941. In that case the
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added). See full text at supra note 3.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
11. [1976-1] TRADE CAS. 1 60,892 at 68,877. There is little, if any, legislative
history that is helpful on this issue. See Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer and Co., 333 F. Supp.
315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
12. [197--1] TRADE CAS. t 60,892 at 68,877. See also The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164
(1880) ; and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-412 (1964) in
which the Supreme Court stated that foreign governments are permitted to bring
suits in the courts of the United States as a matter of international comity.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts has also been extended to international
organizations. See e.g., International Refuge Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp.,
189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1951); Balfour, Guthrie and Co., Ltd. v. United States, 90 F.
Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950); and see, 22 U.S.C. § 288a (1970) which grants to
international organizations the capacity to institute legal proceedings.
13. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution states: "The judicial
power shall extend to all cases . . . [and] controversies . . . between a state, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects."
14. Section 7 of the Sherman Act, Sherman Act, ch. 647, sec. 7, 26 Stat. 210
(1890), Act of July 2, 1890, which was repealed in 1955, was substantially similar
to the present Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
15. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
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Supreme Court held that the United States Government was not
entitled to bring an action in eo nomine under Section 7. The
Court reasoned that, while the United States is generally con-
sidered to be a "juristic person" for most common law purposes,
the word "person," when used in federal statutes, had tradition-
ally not been- interpreted to include the sovereign. 16 The Court
listed two factors in support of its conclusion. First, the plain
language of Section 71 and the meaning of the term "person"
in other sections of the antitrust laws indicated that the Federal
Government was not intended to be included among the class
of "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages under the section.
Judicial decisions,' legislative history and executive interpreta-
tions of the statutory language support this view.19 Secondly,
the Court noted that the United States had been granted other
more effective means of prosecuting violations of the antitrust
laws. It appeared that Congress had not intended to permit the
Federal Government to pursue the more indirect remedy af-
forded by Section 7 when the Government was specifically
authorized to combat anti-competitive practices through the im-
position of civil fines and criminal penalties. 20
A year after the Cooper case was decided, the Supreme Court
considered in particular the question whether a state of the United
States was a "person" within the purview of Section 7. In a brief
opinion, the Court in Georgia v. Evans"' decided that a state
was such a person, and distinguished Cooper on the grounds that
16. Id. at 604.
17. Id. at 605-606. Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, remarked:
[I]t is not our function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the
legislature might or should have made . . . . [I]t is not for the courts to indulge
in the business of policy making in the field of antitrust legislation. Congress has
not left us at large to devise every feasible means for protecting the Government
as a purchaser. It is the function of Congress to fashion means to that end ....
Id. at 606.
18. See e.g. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940) and cases cited at 312
U.S. 600, 610 n.14.
19. 312 U.S. at 611-614.
20. Id. at 614. Mr. Justice Black espoused the contrary view in his dissenting
opinion:
It is, therefore, strange indeed that the Sherman Act, the greatest of all
legislative efforts to make competition, not combination, the law of trade, should
now be found to afford a greater protection against collusive price-fixing to every
other buyer in the United States than is afforded the United States itself.
Id. at 616.
21. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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there was nothing in the antitrust laws, the policies behind them
or their legislative history to indicate an intent on the part of
Congress to preclude domestic states from suing under Section 7
22in eo nomine.
In holding that foreign governments are "persons" within
the meaning of the Clayton Act, the Eighth Circuit in Pfizer,
Inc. v. Government of India relied heavily on the Evans decision.
The pharmaceutical companies had argued that the status of
foreign states with respect to the antitrust laws was akin to that
of the United States government in the Cooper decision. Conse-
quently, the defendants contended that the rule in Cooper ought
to control since that case dealt with the propriety of allowing a
national sovereign standing under the antitrust laws.23
The court of appeals rejected the defendants' reading of
Cooper. Instead the court construed Cooper and Evans to re-
quire a court to focus on the range of remedies available to a
plaintiff or class of plaintiffs in determining whether to grant
private standing under the Clayton Act. The United States gov-
ernment need not be privileged to maintain treble damage suits
since it already possessed a vast array of remedial options under
the statute to combat anticompetitive conduct. On the other
hand, domestic states and (in the court's opinion) foreign govern-
ments have only a single means of obtaining redress for injury
caused by illegal restraints of trade. That is, of course, Section 4
of the Clayton Act. If domestic and foreign states were denied
22. The majority declared:
The State of Georgia, unlike the United States, cannot prosecute violations of
the Sherman Law. Nor can it seize property transported in defiance of it ....
If the State is not a "person" within [Section 7], the Sherman Law leaves it
without any redress for injuries resulting from practices outlawed by the Act.
Id. at 162. (per Frankfurter, J.).
In a passage reminiscent of his opinion in Cooper, supra note 17, Justice Roberts,
dissenting, declared:
It is not our function to speculate as to what Congress probably intended
by the words it used, or to enforce the supposed policy of the Act by adding a
provision which Congress might have incorporated but omitted. Id. at 164.
The Supreme Court has also held that domestic states are "persons" entitled to
sue for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970). Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of
Calif., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Court stated: "Hawaii plainly qualifies as a person
under both sections of the statute [§§ 4 & 16], whether it sues in its proprietary
capacity or as parens patriae." See also In Re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, D.L.
No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
23. [1976-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) ff 60,892 at 68,879.
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standing, they would be deprived of their one opportunity to seek
and obtain redress for harm caused by anticompetitive behavior
in the marketplace.2 4
On rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals approved the rationale employed by the three-judge
panel. 25 Two judges dissented.26 The dissenters agreed with the
drug manufacturers that the reasoning of Cooper, and not Evans,
should dictate the treatment given to foreign government-
plaintiffs under the antitrust laws. They argued that since Con-
gress had not contemplated the inclusion of foreign sovereigns
in the class of eligible plaintiffs under Section 4, "the judiciary
ought not to add foreign governments to the 'person' class with-
out a clear congressional intent to do S0.''27 Finally, the dissenters
observed that the standing issue raised complex questions of
international trade policy and foreign relations which Congress,
and not the courts, ought to assess and resolve.25
The majority's use of the Evans rationale to justify its grant
of standing in Pfizer seems sound from the standpoint of conven-
tional statutory interpretation. The court correctly noted that
the legislative history behind Section 4 and its predecessors was
silent on the subject of foreign state plaintiffs. Like domestic
states, it is certainly true that foreign governments would be
stripped of their most effective remedies under the American anti-
trust laws were they denied standing under Section 4.
Upon deeper analysis, however, the analogy between domestic
states and foreign powers breaks down. American states are
political subdivisions of a single national sovereign regime. The
populations of the several states comprise a constituency of com-
mon legal, historical and economic principles. The activity of
local state economies is inextricably related to that of the national
economic system.
Antitrust violations exert a direct and detrimental effect on
the American public as a whole irrespective of state boundaries.
The purpose of the antitrust laws is not only to preserve com-
petition among businessmen but to ensure that the consuming
24. Id. at 68,878. Compare similar rationale invoked by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Georgia v. Evans, supra note 22.
25. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-2] TRADE CAS. ff 61,175 (8th
Cir. Sept. 3, 1976).
26. Judges Bright and Henley dissented.
27. [1976-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,175 at 70,334.
28. Id.
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public throughout the nation is accorded the benefits of lower
prices, maximum choice among product varieties and unimpeded
flow of goods and services.29 It is this identity of interest between
state and federal governments in the United States that dis-
tinguishes domestic states from foreign sovereigns insofar as the
American antitrust laws are concerned.
An effective antitrust regime is an important element of
national economic policy.3 For this reason, domestic state gov-
ernments are and ought to be vitally interested in the aggressive
enforcement of the antitrust laws. In recognition of the important
role played by the states in enforcing the antitrust laws and
promoting antitrust policy in general, Congress has recently
amended the Clayton Act to encourage state governments to
bring treble damage suits parens patriae; that is, to sue on behalf
of economically injured consumers residing within their respective
jurisdictions.8 1 Significantly, the 1976 Antitrust Improvements
Act did not afford a similar privilege to foreign governments.
The relationship of foreign governments to the United States
economy is quite different. While United States economic policy
decisions exert considerable effects on foreign economies, the goals
and priorities of foreign regimes are, more often than not, at odds
with those of the United States. 2 Producer cartels like OPEC and
the fledgling Bauxite Organization espouse policies diametrically
29. In its report on the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, the House Judiciary Committee recently noted:
The economic burden of many antitrust violations is borne in large measure
by the consumer in the form of higher prices for his goods and services .... All
of these violations are likely to cause injuries to consumers, whether by higher
prices, by illegal limitations of consumer choices or by illegal withholding of
goods and services. They introduce illegal and artificial forces in the market
place, thus undermining our economic system of free enterprise. Frequently anti-
trust violations injure thousands or even millions of consumers. H.R. REP. No.
94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) at 4.
30. Levinson & Eckstein, Staff Report on Employment, Growth & Price Levels
431-440 (1960) in W. GIaIPP & E. WEILER, EcoNoMic POLICY 117-125 (3d ed.
1961). See also C. WiLcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TowARD BUsINESS (4th ed. 1971).
31. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
§ 301, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). It does not appear that these amendments could be con-
strued to allow foreign governments to also bring such suits; at least Congress does
not seen to have considered this question. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS Act OF 1976, S. RE. No. 94-803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976). This fact may indicate that Congress does perceive a difference in the status
of foreign nations and domestic states with respect to their respective ability to bring
treble damage actions.
32. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 188 (2d ed. 1974).
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opposed to the principle of free enterprise which lies at the heart
of American antitrust policy.
3
The difference between domestic and foreign states is also
manifested in their relative ability to obtain redress for anti-
competitive harm outside of the American antitrust regime.
Domestic states are subject to substantial restrictions under
the Constitution when it comes to regulating interstate com-
merce.3 4 These limits to state economic power do not pertain
to foreign governments. The latter have at their disposal a
panoply of legislative and executive powers and immunities
that can be brought against persons who engage in anticom-
petitive activities which work a deleterious effect on their lo-
cal economies.a For example, a foreign state could absolutely
bar an American antitrust violator from doing business within its
borders. Alternatively, a foreign sovereign could impose fines and
other penalties on United States-based multinationals who en-
gage in price fixing conspiracies or exclusionary practices to the
detriment of the foreign sovereign's citizenry. A company's prop-
erty and other assets might even be confiscated for blatantly anti-
competitive conduct. It is doubtful whether a domestic state
could ever invoke any of the above-noted remedies in order to
obtain redress for harm caused to itself or its citizens by com-
panies engaged in illicit or unfair trade practices; the Constitution
33. Pfizer v. Government of India, [1976-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 11 61,175 at 70,334
(dissenting opinion).
34. Constraints on state economic regulatory power are imposed by several provi-
sions in the U.S. Constitution, notably the Commerce Clause (art. I, § 8, cl. 3) ; the
Supremacy Clause (art. VI). Privileges and Immunities Clause (art. IV, § 2, and
amend. XIV, § 1), and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (amends. V &
XIV). See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) (States may prcp-
erly regulate restrictive business practices, provided state antitrust legislation does not
work a denial of fundamental rights or run afoul of specific constitutional provisions). It
is well-established that federal antitrust laws do not preempt state attempts to control
unfair trade practices. See e.g. R. E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App.
3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974); and see Note, The Commerce Clause and State
Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUtn. L. REV. 1469 (1961). These are areas where a state
regulatory power may be circumscribed. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964) ; Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
35. In recent years an increasing number of foreign states have enacted com-
prehensive antitrust statutes. The most sophisticated regulatory regimes are those of
the Western European industrial states and the European Economic Community. For
a discussion of the competition laws of the several European states and the Common
Market and price conflict with the American antitrust regime, see, J. RAHL, COMMON
MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST - OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (1970). See also, W.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 15.1 (2d ed. 1973).
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would forbid any such unilateral action. 6 The fact of the matter
is that foreign states do have alternative remedies available to
them to combat anticompetitive behavior and arguably, for that
reason under the rationale of Georgia v. Evans,87 ought not to
have standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Proponents of standing for foreign governments note that,
given the growing interdependence of national economies in the
contemporary world market, restrictive business practices carried
out in one part of the globe may have considerable harmful impact
on consumers in geographically remote areas.38 Thus, a price
fixing scheme by drug manufacturers localized for the most part
in the United States could be expected to have an injurious effect
on purchasers of pharmaceuticals the world over, including con-
sumers who are also political sovereigns. It has been said that, to
be successful, modem monopolies must be able to dominate
foreign as well as domestic markets.8 9 Viewed from this perspec-
tive it would appear that the overall effectiveness of the United
States antitrust laws depends on the ability of those laws to reach
anticompetitive practices overseas. Consequently, there would be
nothing extraordinary about granting foreign governments stand-
ing to prosecute violators of the antitrust laws of this country
so long as "the maintenance of the action is essential to the ef-
fective enforcement of the antitrust laws."40 The test of standing
is functional and, according to the proponents of standing, should
not depend on the status of the claimant. From the standpoint
of enforcement policy, it makes little or no difference whether
the prosecuting plaintiff is a foreign sovereign or a local druggist,
provided the alleged anticompetitive conduct was causally
connected to the economic injury sustained.4'
Those opposed to standing urge forcefully that allowing
foreign sovereigns to sue in United States courts will have a
36. See generally, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 227
et se. (1972). See also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Cf. Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 96 S. Ct. 535 (1976).
37. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
38. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 15.1 (2d ed.
1973).
39. Kuwait v. Pfizer, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This case
was also part of the Antibiotic Antitrust Litigation, supra note 4.
40. Id. at.316.
41. Velvel, Antitrust Suits By Foreign Nations, 25 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 1, 7
(1975). The author argues effectively in favor of granting standing to foreign
sovereigns.
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detrimental effect on the ability of American enterprise to com-
pete in foreign markets.42 It is argued that American businesses,
already encumbered by the most stringent antitrust laws in the
world, would be further disadvantaged with respect to their
foreign competitors were they held accountable to foreign govern-
ments as well as domestic institutions and citizens.4 3 Opponents
observe that foreign states already possess potent weapons to
combat undesirable restrictive business practices.44 Armed with
a full battery of governmental powers, foreign states can often
deal with foreign investors and manufacturers with impunity. It
would be unfair and unnecessary, say the opponents, for the
American courts to endow foreign sovereigns with still further
power under these circumstances.
Proponents maintain, on the other hand, that the existence
of alternate remedies in favor of foreign governments is imma-
terial to the issue of antitrust standing.45 Even assuming that
foreign states have the legal machinery necessary to pursue
monopolistic multinationals, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
foreign tribunals to obtain jurisdiction over and conduct dis-
covery upon American corporations accused of engaging in unfair
business activities. 46 To encourage foreign nations to resort to
extra-judicial self-help remedies, such as expropriation, might
contravene United States foreign policy and jeopardize American
economic interests overseas. 7
In the opinion of this author, the aforegoing policy con-
siderations make it clear that the question of granting antitrust
standing to foreign sovereigns is not simply a problem of statutory
interpretation, as the majority of the Eighth Circuit viewed it in
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India.48 The issue is not purely a
42. See Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Sen. Commerce Comm., 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) and Int'l Aspects
of Antitrust Laws, Hearings Before Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1973-1974) at 1416 et seq.
But see Testimony of Samuel Pisar, Id. at 131 et seq.
43. Id.
44. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,175
at 70,033 (Bright & Henley, J.J., dissenting).
45. See Note, The Capacity of Foreign Sovereigns to Maintain Private Federal
Antitrust Actions, 9 CORNEML INT'L L.J. 137, 143 (1975).
46. Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae at 24, Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,
522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
47. Velvel, supra note 41 at 10.
48. [197-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 1 60,892 (8th Cir. 1976).
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legal one. There is an important ideological dimension to the
polemic: should American courts take it upon themselves to grant
standing to foreign states which openly discourage or even sup-
press free competition in their home economies?4 9 Would the
Pfizer court have been willing to allow standing to the Soviet
Union or some other Eastern Bloc state? It would appear that the
internal economic and political policies and philosophies of a
foreign government are irrelevant to the issue of standing, if the
primary objective of allowing private plaintiffs to sue is to bolster
the effectiveness of the American antitrust laws.
If a system of international free competition is a worthwhile
goal, perhaps the best solution to the problems of unfair competi-
tion and anticompetitive conduct by multinational concerns will
be attained not by means of conventional domestic judicial reme-
dies, but rather through the medium of a comprehensive inter-
national antitrust agreement. 0 In any event, it is evident that
the problem of standing for foreign governments under the Ameri-
can antitrust laws is far more complex than the Eighth Circuit in
Pfizer v. Government of India would lead one to believe. To treat
the question as a mundane exercise in statutory interpretation is
to neglect the subtle but ever so important economic, political
and ideological issues involved. These considerations require ex-
tensive debate and examination by the political branches of
government, and Congress in particular.5'
Jeannine McGrane
49. It is not suggested that United States domestic law should distinguish between
foreign governments on the basis of their internal antitrust policies. On this issue the
dissenting opinion stated: "(w)e note that many foreign countries foster monopolistic
practices as a matter of government policy .... Granting such sovereigns the right
to sue American companies will not diminish their own restraint of trade." Pfizer,
Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 61,175 at 70,334 (8th
Cir. 1976).
50. See generally, Joelson and Voghis, Groping for a Truly International Anti-
trust Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1973); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMCE AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 460 (2d ed. 1973).
51. See Ross, J. concurring in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, [1976-1]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,892 at 68, 879 (8th Cir. 1976).
I believe, however, that Congress gave no consideration nor did it have any legis-
tive intent whatsoever, concerning the question of whether foreign governments
are "persons" under the Act. In my opinion, it is time for Congress to reexamine
this extremely important question and clarify it by legislation.
